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Vego: On Littoral Warfare

ON LIT TOR AL WARFARE
Milan Vego

N

aval warfare in the littorals has much in common with war conducted on
the open ocean. However, there are also some significant differences, due
to the extremely complex, dynamic, and challenging physical environment of
the former. The peculiarities of the physical environment in the littorals offer
many challenges—but also opportunities—in the employment of naval forces
and aircraft. Distinctions between characteristics
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relatively rare. Because of the rapidity and possibly drastic changes in the tactical
and operational situations, warfare in the littorals requires a highly decentralized
command and control (C2). This means a true application of German-style “mission command”—otherwise, success will be wanting.
IMPORTANCE
The political, military, demographic, and economic importance of the littorals
has steadily increased over the past two decades. In 1991, the collapse of the
Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact brought an end to the Cold War. This in turn
had a major impact on the international political and security environment.
Animosities between various nation-states that had been held in check during
the Cold War came into the open. An era of global certainty and predictability
was replaced by one marked by uncertainty, turmoil, and chaos.1 The threat of
war between major powers has been reduced, but lesser threats to international
order have proliferated, in growing scope, diversity, and frequency.2 During the
past decade Southwest Asia, the Greater Middle East, North Africa, the western
Pacific, and most recently Eastern Europe have emerged as the new areas of tensions, conflict, and potentially even major regional wars. It appears that in case of
a high-intensity conventional war, combat actions at sea would be predominantly
conducted in the littoral waters.
About 80 percent of all countries border the sea, and approximately 95 percent
of the world’s population lives within six hundred miles of the coast. Some 60
percent of the world’s politically significant urban areas are located within sixty
miles of the coast, and 70 percent within three hundred miles.3 About 80 percent of the world’s capitals are in the littorals.4 The littorals account for about 16
percent of the world’s oceanic expanse.5 Yet they are critically important because
all seaborne trade originates and ends there. The sea remains the primary, and
by far the most cost-effective, means for the movement of international trade.
In 2013, about 80 percent of the global trade by volume was carried by ships.6
The importance of the world’s oceans and seas to the economic well-being and
security of nations and to the projection of power has perhaps never been greater
than it is today.
A blue-water navy now faces much greater and more-diverse threats in the
littorals than in the past. This is especially the case in enclosed and semienclosed
seas, such as the Persian (Arabian) Gulf. The threat is especially acute within
and near the world’s international straits, such as Hormuz and Malacca. The
threat to one’s forces steadily increases as one approaches an enemy coast. The
weaker, defending side can have integrated a widely distributed reconnaissance/
surveillance system with seagoing platforms, land-based aircraft, air and
coastal defenses, ground troops, and special operations forces into an effective
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss2/4
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multilayered defense. The defender can reach out much farther and more strongly than might be expected, catching the attacking force off guard.7
The primary antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities in the littorals are
land-based aircraft, diesel-electric attack submarines (SSKs) fitted with airindependent propulsion (AIP), multipurpose corvettes, fast attack craft (FACs),
coastal missile/gun batteries, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), midget submarines, sophisticated mines, and medium- and short-range ballistic missiles
(MRBMs/SRBMs). In addition, stealthy surface craft armed with small-caliber
guns, short-range rockets, or even suicide boats can threaten not only one’s commercial shipping but in some cases even larger surface combatants. One of the
most serious threats to survivability of large surface ships and merchant shipping,
however, is posed by long-range antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs). The most
advanced ASCMs can be used against either ships or targets on land. They can
be fired by submarines, surface ships, aircraft, and concealed coastal missile sites.
For example, the People’s Republic of China is currently developing sophisticated A2/AD multilayered defenses extending several hundred miles from the
coast. These defenses consist of space-, air-, and ground-based radars, and overthe-horizon radars, bombers, fighter-bombers, and multipurpose attack aircraft
carrying air-to-surface missiles (ASMs) and ASCMs.8 The Chinese navy is also
introducing into service large numbers of modern surface combatants armed
with ASCMs, as well as AIP SSKs armed with ASCMs, torpedoes, and mines.
Approaches to the Chinese coast are defended by numerous coastal missile
and gun batteries. The Chinese have very large inventories of highly advanced
mines. They also have at their disposal several hundred SRBMs and MRBMs
for use against targets on land. They have developed antiship ballistic missiles
with ranges of a thousand miles plus, as well as a highly integrated air-defense
system (IADS) with sophisticated surface-to-air missiles and fourth- and
fifth-generation fighter aircraft. The Chinese A2/AD assets also include highly
advanced and hardened C2 networks, antisatellite weapons, and cyberattack
capabilities.9
Likewise, Iran is also trying to create multilayered defenses within the Strait of
Hormuz and its approaches. Currently, the Iranian navy has in its inventory large
numbers of ASCM-armed missile craft, several thousands of mines (both old and
very advanced), and several quiet SSKs and midget submarines. ASCM batteries
are deployed on the coast and islands within the strait. The Iranian A2/AD capabilities also include a number of land-based attack aircraft armed with ASCMs,
UAVs, and several hundred SRBMs and MRBMs. They also have an increasingly
sophisticated IADS.10 The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy operates a
small number of ASM-armed boats, as well as stealthy torpedo boats; hundreds of
small speedboats armed with machine guns, multiple rocket launchers, or ASMs;
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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remotely controlled radar decoy and explosive-filled boats; and a small number
of semisubmersible attack craft.11
DEFINING THE TERM
The term “littoral” (from the Latin litus, “shore”) is often used but is not always
properly defined or understood. In its simplest definition, “littoral” means a
“coastal region” or “refers to a shore.”12 In geographic terms, the term pertains to a
coastline zone between extreme high and low tides. The U.S. military defines the
littoral as consisting of two segments of the “operational” environment: seaward
(the area from the open ocean to the shore that must be controlled to support
operations ashore) and landward (the area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly from the sea).13 Yet this usage is on one hand too
broad and imprecise, and on the other, it overlooks a fairly wide range of relevant
geographical conditions.
Littorals, properly speaking, encompass areas bordering the waters of open peripheral seas, large archipelagoes, and enclosed and semienclosed seas. Littorals
bordering open oceans, such as the coasts of North and South America, Africa,
and India, extend outward to the farthest extent of the continental shelf. The
width of the continental shelf varies from less than a hundred miles off the west
coast of North and South America to nearly eight hundred miles from the Arctic
coast of North America and Eurasia. The average width of the continental shelf,
however, is between two hundred and five hundred miles. The depth of water on
the continental shelf averages 250 feet.14
“Peripheral” (or marginal) seas are parts of an ocean bordering the continental
landmass and partially enclosed by peninsulas, island chains, or archipelagoes,
such as the East China Sea and the South China Sea. They lie on downwardsloping portions of the continental shelf and are uniformly deep. Littorals also
include large archipelagoes completely or partially surrounded by open ocean,
such as the Malay (or Indonesian) and Solomons Archipelagoes.
The most complex physical environments for employment of naval forces
are those of “enclosed” and “semienclosed” seas. An enclosed sea, such as the
Baltic or the Adriatic, lies wholly within the continental shelf and is surrounded
by a landmass except for a strait connecting it to an ocean or another enclosed
or semienclosed sea. Because of their restricted communication with the open
ocean, enclosed seas have small tidal ranges or are tideless.15 Enclosed seas are
also called “continental seas” if they rest on shallow depressions, as do the Sea of
Azov and the Baltic. In contrast, a semienclosed, or partly enclosed, sea is contiguous to a continent and is linked by two or more straits/narrows to the open
ocean; an example is the North Sea. Semienclosed seas are characterized by large
tidal ranges.16
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss2/4
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Enclosed and semienclosed seas are popularly called “narrow seas.”17 In the
military meaning of the term, a narrow sea is a body of water that can be controlled from either side. Hence, this term can be properly applied to all enclosed
and semienclosed seas, as well as to their long and narrow entrances (such as the
English Channel, or La Manche), or certain restricted areas within a narrow sea
(such as the Sicilian Narrows). It is in a narrow sea that a blue-water navy, like the
U.S. Navy, would likely have the most difficulty in projecting its power ashore.
OPERATING AREA
The operating areas in the littorals differ considerably in terms of their sizes,
distances, hydrography, oceanography, and the proximity of the landmass to the
open ocean. The oceans themselves are characterized by huge size and distances
measured in thousands of miles; the Atlantic Ocean covers an area of some 41.0
million square miles and varies in width from 1,770 miles (between Brazil and
Liberia) to three thousand miles (between the east coast of the United States and
North Africa). They are uniformly deep, except for the waters off the continents.
In contrast, a typical narrow sea presents a much smaller area to be controlled or
defended. For example, the Baltic Sea covers 163,000 square miles, extends along
its north–south axis for about 920 nautical miles (nm), and has an average width
a little over 105 nm. The Persian (Arabian) Gulf is about 615 miles long and between forty and 220 miles wide, with an area of about 92,600 square miles.18 With
its 950,000 square miles, the Mediterranean Sea is the largest of all narrow seas.
It extends west to east more than 2,400 miles, and its maximum width is about
a thousand miles. The Mediterranean encompasses several smaller narrow seas
(the Tyrrhenian, Ionian, Adriatic, and Aegean).
In an enclosed or semienclosed sea, the distances separating various points on
the opposing shores are fairly short. For example, in the Baltic Sea, the distance
between Kiel and Helsinki is about 625 nm; the port of Tallinn (formerly Reval)
is only about 220 nm from Stockholm; some 230 nm separate Copenhagen and
Rostock. For the North Sea, the British port of Hull is only about 280 nm from
the German port of Emden and some 210 nm from Ostend. The German port
of Cuxhaven lies about 475 nm from Scapa Flow, in the Orkneys. Such short
distances considerably affect the employment of surface ships, submarines, and
aircraft: transit times are short, and high sustained speeds are less critical than
in transiting oceans. Small areas combined with short distances allow employment of not only large but also small surface ships and submarines. Units can
be deployed and redeployed at short notice and within hours. Submarines, by
conducting attacks in various parts of a narrow sea, can create an impression that
a larger number of them are present than is the case.19
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The short distances in a typical narrow sea also allow the use of all types of
fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. Short flying times allow more sorties and
longer time over target areas. Aircraft can be quickly deployed and redeployed
between various points. The probability of achieving surprise is also greatly
enhanced, especially if aircraft approach targets at low altitudes or over land. In
addition, a damaged aircraft has a much better chance of reaching the safety of
its base than if operating over the open ocean. Finally, short distances allow the
side that is stronger in the air to dominate a theater to a far greater degree than
on the open ocean.
Lines of operation and lines of communications in enclosed-sea theaters are
fewer in number and much shorter than on the open ocean. If a coast is fronted
by islands or an archipelago, these lines are predictable to the enemy because they
are few in number. Few, if any, alternatives are available. But in a typical narrow
sea, shipping routes assume very different patterns: they run along the coast (i.e.,
longitudinally), from one shore to the opposite one (laterally), or again longitudinally between sea exit(s) and ports of destination within a given narrow sea.
They usually have the largest traffic volume and require, of the three categories
of routes, the greatest effort to control fully. Longitudinal sea routes, from one
port to another along one’s own coastline within the effective range of coastal
defenses, are generally easier to protect. Where coastal waters are deep, as off
Norway, longitudinal sea routes can run very close to shore. It is even easier to
protect longitudinal sea routes if the coast is fronted by several island rows, as is
the case along the Dalmatian coast. However, longitudinal sea routes are long and
few in number; hence, they offer many opportunities for the enemy attack. Attackers can choose parts of the route that are exposed or poorly defended, as well
as the time. They have much greater diversity of targets, because coastal routes
would be used by many types of commercial and military shipping.20
Lateral routes are shorter and more numerous than are coastal routes. However, they are also much more vulnerable to an enemy attack because they run
across the high seas, where their defense is difficult; they can be secured usually
only near the ports of origin and destination. Friendly ships using lateral routes
would be unable to maneuver and seek protection closer to their own coast.21
Narrow seas are characterized by the presence of large numbers of friendly,
enemy, and neutral commercial vessels, warships, and auxiliaries. In peacetime,
waters near coasts are typically crowded with fishing, resource-exploitation, and
scientific vessels plus numerous recreational craft. For example, some ninetythree thousand ships passed through the Skaw and the Kiel Canal in 2009.22 In
the Mediterranean, some two hundred thousand merchant vessels larger than a
hundred tons, or about 30 percent of the world’s maritime shipping, transit every
year. Most of that traffic is bound for areas outside the Mediterranean.23
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss2/4
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The straits connecting narrow seas to the open ocean or other narrow seas are
also called “choke points.”24 Density of shipping at the approaches to and within
the international straits is higher than on the open ocean. There are several
thousand straits in the world, but only between 95 and 121 have international
importance.25 International straits are both the hubs and the most vulnerable
segments of sea communications. Several of these—including, notably, those of
Hormuz, Malacca, and Singapore—are considered global choke points of world
trade, with extremely large economic, political, and military importance. For
example, in 2011 seventeen million barrels per day (bb/d), about 35 percent of
all crude-oil traffic worldwide, passed through the Strait of Hormuz.26 In 2011,
about 15.2 million bb/d of crude oil passed through the Strait of Malacca.27 Some
sixty thousand ships pass through it each year.28 If that strait were closed for any
reason, almost half of the world’s merchant shipping would have to use alternative choke points—specifically, the Lombok Strait (between Bali and Lombok)
and the Sunda Strait (between Java and Sumatra).29 About 3.4 million bb/d of
oil was transported through the eighteen-mile-wide Bab el Mandeb in 2011.30 In
2010, some 2.9 million bb/d passed through the Turkish Straits, seventeen miles
long and only half a mile wide; each year some fifty thousand ships, including five
thousand tankers, transit this navigationally very difficult waterway.31
Straits/narrows are the keys to controlling naval and commercial shipping
movements from and to enclosed- or semienclosed-sea theaters. A belligerent
that controls both sides of a strait can employ naval forces and establish coastal
defenses to prevent an attacker from entering a given enclosed-sea theater. The
location, length, width, and depth of a choke point largely determine its economic and military importance. A strait that, like the Strait of Hormuz or the
Danish straits, is the only access to an enclosed sea has particular significance.
The length of important straits varies greatly, from the thousand-mile-long
Mozambique Channel to the only three-mile-long Strait of Tiran (the entry to
the Gulf of Aqaba). The Persian Gulf is linked to the Arabian Sea by the Strait of
Hormuz, 120 miles long and twenty-four to sixty miles wide.32 The 550-mile-long
strait of Malacca connects the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea.
Some international straits are very narrow, which greatly affects a ship’s speed
and maneuverability. For example, the Strait of Malacca is only about 1.5 nm
wide at its narrowest point, as is the Phillip Channel in the Singapore Strait. Shallow depth adds to the navigational hazards of some straits; for example, the Strait
of Malacca is only seventy to 120 feet deep, while the Bosporus and Dardanelles
are 110 and 160 feet deep, respectively.33 Some straits, however, are very deep, like
Gibraltar (1,100 feet) and Lombok (one thousand feet). Navigation through some
important straits is made difficult by strong currents. For example, the current in
the Shimonoseki Strait (between Honshu and Kyushu) runs at up to eight knots.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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The San Bernardino Strait (between Bicol Island, Luzon, and Samar) has tidal
currents of four to eight knots.
The configuration and physical features of the coast affect in important ways
the length and directional orientation of bases of operations, the organization of
surveillance, and coastal defense. The employment of naval forces and aircraft in
a narrow sea is greatly affected by length of the coastline, the number and size
of natural harbors, the terrain, the presence of offshore islands, the abundance
or scarcity of natural resources, and inland communications. When a coast
is backed by high mountain ridges and washed by deep water, as is Norway’s
coast, naval and commercial vessels can sail close to shore, where detection by
shipborne radar is more difficult. On elevated or mountainous coasts, communications are often scarce or entirely lacking. If a mountain chain runs close and
parallel to the coast, the roads and railroads usually run in the same direction.
A steep, rocky, and highly indented coast, or one with fjords separated by rocky
headlands and numerous rivers, makes longitudinal communications difficult,
while rocky beaches make it difficult to carry out conventional, large-scale amphibious landings.
Generally, a low-lying coast is favorable for the development of the road/
railroad network, which can in turn greatly reduce the need for coastal shipping.
Conversely, a coast with poor land communications means greater reliance on
coastal shipping to transport military and commercial cargo. Land traffic in the
littorals can easily be interrupted for long periods, especially if the principal roads
or railways run close and parallel to a coast backed by steep, high mountains.
A flat coast with few or no offshore islands is generally favorable to landings
by sizable forces. It also facilitates the movement of forces into the interior. Generally, coral reefs and very shallow water extending far from shore favor defense
against conventional amphibious assaults. Swamps and marshes in the coastal
area can considerably impede or canalize vehicular traffic, especially heavy armor
and mechanized forces.
A highly indented coast backed by high ground allows the construction of
underground shelters for submarines and small surface combatants. Shelters,
usually built of concrete and fitted with heavy steel doors, provide protection
against air attack, even with nuclear weapons. They also can offer a range of repair facilities and crew accommodation for several weeks. For example, Sweden
has built along its coast what is probably the world’s most extensive and sophisticated underground facility at Muskö, near Stockholm. Until much of it was
closed in 2004, when the Swedish navy decided to use only its two major naval
bases, at Karlskrona and Berga, Muskö had three docks and was able to handle
fast attack craft, submarines, and destroyers. China is reportedly building a secret
underground naval base at Sanya, on the southern tip of Hainan. There massive
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss2/4
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sixty-foot-high tunnel entrances are being built into hillsides. The base would
reportedly accommodate up to twenty nuclear-powered submarines.34
Offshore islands are potentially a great obstacle to any attacker. At the same
time, however, they require larger forces for defense. For example, Finland’s coast
is fronted by some 790 islands larger than 0.4 square miles, plus some 178,500
islets; along Sweden’s coast are about 98,370 islands/islets. The Stockholm Archipelago alone consists of about thirty thousand islands/islets. Sweden’s coastline,
including islands, stretches for some 37,755 miles. Large archipelagoes, as in the
Aegean, include many uninhabited islands, which greatly complicate the problem
of defense. In contrast, a long coast without offshore islands, such as the Iranian
coast in the Persian (Arabian) Gulf, is highly vulnerable to attack from the sea.
Narrow passages between islands can be blocked by mines and coastal missile
or gun batteries. Numerous islands canalize the movements of the enemy forces.
Several island chains running parallel with the mainland coast extend the defensive depth of the coastal area. A multitude of offshore islands offers the possibility of dispersing bases and thereby making them less vulnerable; small surface
combatants can change bases or anchorages in hours. Protected bays or channels
offer refuges for ships, and islands conceal the movements of surface ships and
troop transports.35
If islands extend transversely from the coast, as off Dalmatia’s coast, the channels separating them are usually wide and deep, allowing quick, concealed, and
relatively easy deployment and redeployment of naval forces. An archipelago,
such as the Aegean (1,415 islands) or the Malay (twenty-five thousand, between
the Indian and the Pacific Oceans), allows great flexibility in the selection of
lines of operation and easy and secure “castling” (leapfrogging) of naval forces.
It also provides excellent opportunities for mines in the defense of naval bases,
commercial ports, and sea traffic. In general, the more numerous the islands, the
more difficult the detection of small surface combatants.
Most narrow seas are characterized by shallow water (less than two hundred
fathoms deep). For example, about 60 percent of the Baltic Sea is less than 150
feet deep. The depth of water in the Gulf of Finland varies from 110 to just over
three hundred feet. The average depth of the Adriatic Sea is about 650 feet.36 In
the Persian (Arabian) Gulf, the mean depth is about eighty feet, and the water is
rarely deeper than three hundred feet; the deepest water is found off the Iranian
coast, while depths off Saudi Arabia’s coast average 110 feet. Maximum depth in
the Yellow Sea is 460 feet, and the mean depth is only 150 feet.37
Shallow water restricts, and can even preclude, the employment of major surface combatants. The speed of large surface ships must be considerably reduced
when transiting very shallow waters (ten-to-forty-foot depths). In confined
waters, such as channels, a ship’s speed can be reduced up to 60 percent. The
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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effects of water depth are rather significant for surface ships at speeds higher
than twenty-five knots. For example, at thirty knots in eighty-foot depths, wave
resistance is almost three times greater than in 115-foot water and five times
more than in deep water (more than 1,200 feet).38 A surface ship proceeding at
five, ten, fifteen, or twenty knots requires minimum depths of thirteen, fifty-six,
125, and 220 feet, respectively.39
Safe operations by a submarine require certain clearances above the mast and
under the keel. Normally, a nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) should have
a minimum of fifty feet of water under its keel; an SSK needs from thirty-five to
forty feet. This figure does not include the much greater depth required for a
submarine to maneuver in evading attack. Depending on the water transparency,
a submarine may need to operate several dozen feet farther down to prevent detection from the air. At periscope a submarine’s keel depth is from fifty to sixtyfive feet, depending on sea state and periscope/mast extension. For example, the
periscope depth for the German Type 212A is about forty feet. Reportedly, the
periscope depth for an American SSN is less than a hundred feet (from the keel).
The character of the seabed can either facilitate submarine operations or make
them very difficult. In general, a smooth seafloor allows submarines to lie on
the bottom during a pursuit. The presence of shipwrecks can provide a hiding
place. An SSK can use bathymetry, bottom composition, topography, and nearby
wrecks to hide from pursuers.40 It would be difficult to detect if it settled on the
seabed in less than a hundred feet of water, switched off its engines, and shut all
seawater inlets. A bottom-lying SSK looks to sensors like a sunken ship; only a
human operator can tell the difference. An SSN, however, cannot sit on the sea
bottom, for fear of clogging vital inlets to condensers.41
Shallow water considerably complicates the use of less advanced torpedoes
by surface combatants and submarines. For example, most advanced lightweight
torpedoes, such as the U.S. Mark 46 Mod5A (SW), specially designed for use in
shallow water, require a minimum depth of about 148 feet when fired by a surface
ship. In contrast, advanced heavyweight torpedoes, such as the U.S. Mark 48 Mod
6 AT, require much greater minimum depth for launching because of their initial
negative buoyancy. Yet some heavyweight torpedoes—for example, the German
WASS Black Shark—can be reportedly fired even from a bottom-sitting boat.42
Shallow water facilitates the use of all types of mines. For example, bottom
mines for use against enemy submarines can be laid to a depth of about 660 feet,
yet their effectiveness diminishes significantly below 230 feet. Rocket-propelled
rising mines can be used down to 650 feet. Antisubmarine rising mines fitted
with rocket-propelled torpedoes may be laid in water depths exceeding 3,300
feet. Modern moored mines could be laid at depths from fifteen feet to, depending on their size, five thousand feet or even more. Pressure influence mines
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss2/4
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cannot be laid at depths greater than a hundred to 165 feet; otherwise they would
be ineffective against enemy surface ships.43
In general, electronic sensors when used close to a coast are prone to degradation due to a variety of climatic, electromagnetic (EM), and atmospheric anomalies, the presence of a large landmass, human-made clutter, and the proximity of
multiple EM sources.44 The performance of radar, electronic support measures
(ESM), and communications systems varies with temperature, pressure, humidity,
cloud formation, and storm activity. Another problem is presence of a large number of cellular telephone networks and such commercial land-based emitters as
television, commercial aircraft, and ships. This, in turn, creates substantial difficulties in using ESM sensors to sort out and identify emitters or signals of interest.
The combined effect in the littorals of a considerable difference between the
temperature of the air and that of the sea and the proximity of landmass often
causes nonstandard propagation of EM waves. “Subrefraction” occurs when air
temperature decreases or humidity increases rapidly with height, causing EM
waves to bend upward or away from the earth’s surface. “Super-refraction” takes
place when the relative humidity of the air steadily decreases with altitude instead
of remaining constant or when the air temperature decreases at a rate less than
standard. EM waves can then bend down much more sharply, striking the sea
surface, reflecting upward again, curving back down to the sea surface, and so
on continuously. Both of these phenomena significantly affect the range of radar
and radio communications, and electro-optical (EO) sensors. Subrefraction
causes shorter ranges for radars operating within such a layer; super-refraction
would extend the range of radars, but targets would appear closer and at higher
altitudes than actual.45 Subrefractive EO propagation causes reduced detection
ranges against low-elevation air threats, while super-refractive propagation can
present the threat against a background of strong solar glint or infrared clutter.46
The extreme case of super-refraction, known as “ducting,” or trapping, occurs
in conditions of temperature inversion—that is, when a warmer layer of air lies
above a cooler layer and EM waves are trapped near the surface. If a trapping
layer exists, a duct may form, and it may extend above the trapping layer.47 Under
some conditions ducts significantly extend the propagation of EM waves, but
they can also create blind zones where radar cannot detect targets. For example,
radar might detect an aircraft flying at five thousand feet at ninety nautical miles
but not one at six thousand feet at the same range.48
Large land/sea temperature differences often occur in the littorals. This
phenomenon is caused by heating over land surfaces during the day while the
temperature over water remains fairly constant, generating diurnal lateral movements of air—sea breezes during the day and land breezes at night.49 Near-shore
breezes can cause surface ducts and thereby degrade radar performance.
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The performance of the shipboard radars against low-flying aerial targets close
to the coast is also adversely affected by land clutter.50 Doppler radars are able
to detect larger targets in the presence of land clutter. In contrast, pulsed radars
(which lack perfect waveform stability because the clutter signal is often much
stronger than the target signal) have great difficulty in detecting small targets
even after the effect of clutter is greatly minimized.51 Very often false targets are
created and actual targets masked. The Falklands/Malvinas War of 1982 illustrates the great problems of using shipborne radars for detection and identification of low-flying targets in the presence of land clutter.52
The irregular distribution of shapes and sizes of waves, wind speed and direction, swell height and direction, and biologics can greatly affect radar returns
from the sea surface, causing sea clutter. Radar return from the sea surface depends on operating frequency, polarization, and grazing angle. Sea clutter causes
difficulties in discriminating small targets, such as submarine periscopes, from
background noise. Also, multiple false targets would make detection of targets
with low radar cross section (RCS) extremely difficult.53
CHARACTERISTICS
Warfare in the littorals has certain characteristics not found on the open ocean.
These distinctions are especially pronounced in narrow seas, owing to their small
size, short distances, the presence (often) of many offshore islands, and shallowness of water. The operating areas of both enemy and friendly forces encompass
not only littoral waters but also coasts, offshore islands, and parts in the interior
within the range of shipborne weapons.
Littorals are not isolated theaters of war; they lie on the flanks of troops operating along the coast. In the Italian campaign in 1943–45, for example, the flanks
of the Allied armies were on Italy’s western and eastern coasts. In the GermanSoviet war, the strategic flanks of both sides were the Baltic and Black Seas.54 Likewise, during the Korean War, 1950–53, the coasts of the Korean Peninsula bordering the Sea of Japan (East Sea, for the Koreans) and the Yellow Sea (Western
Sea) represented the flanks of both the United Nations and the North Korean /
Chinese ground forces.
In contrast to war on the open ocean, combat action in the littorals can encompass a major part, or even the whole of, a theater, as the North Sea in 1914–18 and
the Solomons campaign of 1942–44 illustrate. Numerous actions between small
surface combatants took place in the English Channel in 1940–44, the Sicilian
Narrows in 1940–43, the Black Sea in 1941–44, and the Adriatic in 1943–45. As
noted above, lines of operation in a typical narrow sea and, hence, deployment
and redeployment times are rather short. In the struggle for control of the English
Channel in 1940–44, lines of operation for the German forces varied from about
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss2/4
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eighty-four nautical miles at the latitude of Brest to only eighteen at the narrowest
part of the Channel.55
The restricted maneuvering space in a typical narrow sea, especially with
shoals and reefs, is even more confined if one or both opponents lay mines. For
example, in the English Channel the operational areas for both the Germans and
Allied forces were much reduced by, aside from the many navigational hazards,
extensive mined areas. Most of the mine barriers laid by both sides were in the
middle of the English Channel.56 The opposing naval forces were forced to concentrate rather than disperse, facilitating mutual support but making them more
vulnerable to attack.
The small size of the typical narrow sea allows both the attacker and the defender to keep a large part of the theater under constant observation. Even the
weaker side can conduct continuous reconnaissance throughout the theater.
Hence, large surface ships would have difficulty remaining undetected.57 Smaller
hostile ships, however, can take advantage of the high density of shipping traffic
combined with the presence of offshore islands and islets to conceal their presence.58 The presence of noncombatants also makes identification of targets much
more complicated than on the open ocean. Shipborne radars would detect lowflying aircraft or ASCMs at much shorter distances than their nominal maximum
effective ranges because of the presence of land clutter. Likewise, airborne radars
have problems detecting aerial targets flying either very low or over terrain with
highly reflective properties.
Detection of the enemy submarines and mines in the littorals is also much
more complex and uncertain than on the open ocean. This is largely the result
of the prevalent shallowness of water, peculiarities of hydrographic and oceanographic conditions, and high ambient noise. In shallow water, sound propagation
is generally difficult to predict, because of great seasonal and daily variations of
sea temperature, salinity, waves, tides and currents, any influx of freshwater, and
the reflection and absorption due to variations of the seabed. In addition, natural
and man-made ambient noise compounds the problem of hunting for submarines in shallow waters.
One of the major problems in using acoustic sensors in shallow water for classification of contacts is a high false-alarm rate. An indented coast fronted by numerous islands and islets makes classifying sonar contacts extremely difficult. In
general, the longer a sonar’s detection range, notably for passive sonar, the greater
the problem; the number of contacts increases approximately as the square of detection range.59 Many false sonar contacts result from the high irregularity of the
sea bottom; underwater cliffs and slopes may resemble submarines lying close to
or on the bottom.60 False contacts result in not only wasted time but unnecessary
expenditure of fuel, sonobuoys, and weapons.61 If the sea bottom is composed of
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metalliferous rock, magnetic anomaly detectors often produce false alarms.62 As
a result of all the above, detection range of submarines by surface ships is much
shorter in shallow water than on the open ocean, especially against quiet SSKs.
An SSK that is motionless or moving at less than five knots and is positioned near
wrecks or rocky pinnacles is almost impossible to detect with acoustic sensors.63
Also, submarine-versus-submarine detection ranges are very short because of
their improved stealth features, meaning, again, much shorter reaction times.64
In comparison to war on the open ocean, warning and reaction time in the
littorals is much reduced by short distances and the high speed of modern platforms and weapons. This is especially the case in narrow seas with islands where
small surface combatants can hide and attack suddenly at short range. ASCMs
can be launched from concealed positions behind islands, the terrain being used
to mask their trajectories, leaving very little time for targets to react. The problem
of early detection is compounded by land clutter, plus, in some cases, heavy seas.
In the littorals, surface ships are especially vulnerable to the attacks by ASCMs
and torpedoes. Supersonic ASCMs fly at very low altitude and can conduct complicated evasive maneuvers in the terminal phase of their flight. For example,
an ASCM flying at Mach 2.5 and at low altitude would be detected at a range of
fifteen miles; it would take only thirty-three seconds to reach its intended target.
Advanced ASCMs can be programmed to escape detection by abruptly changing direction and attacking a different target in the same general area. A target
would have great difficulty countering ASCMs fired simultaneously or in a short
interval by a combination of aircraft, surface ships, submarines, and coastal sites.
The same challenge of short reaction time applies to heavyweight torpedoes.
A typical distance for launching a heavyweight torpedo from a submarine is
between 5.0 and 8.0 nm. However, this distance is considerably shorter when
torpedoes are launched by a small surface combatant or a submarine in an ambush position.
Missions of small surface combatants in littorals are typically short, because of
their short range and low endurance. For example, a combat mission for a missile
craft could vary from several to about a dozen hours. The duration of a mission
by a small surface combatant would depend not only on its endurance but also on
the length of the period of darkness. The latter depends on the time of year and
geographic latitude of the operating area. For example, because of Allied air superiority after the summer of 1942, German S-boats (Schnellbooten, torpedo boats)
based on the occupied coasts of France, Belgium, and the Netherlands were able
to operate only at night. During short summer nights the S-boats concentrated
their attacks against convoys in the Strait of Dover and the approaches to Plymouth, while in the long winter nights, S-boats based in the Netherlands extended
their missions up to the estuary of the River Humber, in England.65
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The situation on the surface greatly depends on those in the air and on land.
Control of a given part of the theater will be directly related to the size of forces
present, and the duration of their stay.66 The high speeds of modern surface
combatants and their ability to combine maneuver and “fires,” together with
the features of the physical environment, potentially allow one side to achieve
surprise. The weaker side may not operate in the way one thinks it would, using asymmetric responses to neutralize or even nullify the advantages normally
enjoyed by a blue-water navy. The weaker side would try to inflict large losses on
the stronger. Its FACs and SSKs can attack from an ambushing position close to
the coast or within a group of islands.
One of the main features of naval combat in the littorals generally is frequent
and radical change in the tactical and operational situations. In general in the littorals, frequency of contact between opposing forces would be much higher than
on the open ocean.67 Combat there—thanks to long-range, highly precise, and
ever more lethal weapons, such as ASCMs, land-attack cruise missiles, advanced
torpedoes, and other smart weapons—would be most likely decisive. Most surface combat would be fought at close range; encounters would be sudden, short,
and violent. In a war between two strong opponents, the intensity of surface and
air combat, and with it consumption of fuel and ammunition, would be very high.
As a result, logistical sustainment would be critically important to success.
Because of the ever-present and serious threat from the air, most surface actions in the littorals would take place at night or in bad weather. For example,
prior to 1942 British coastal forces operating in the English Channel and the
North Sea were highly vulnerable to attack by the Luftwaffe aircraft during the
day unless provided effective fighter cover.68 Hence, most of their missions were
conducted during the night. By the summer of 1942, the Luftwaffe’s superiority
over the Channel had ended. From August 1942 to July 1943, when the majority of German shipping moved along the coast from the Scheldt River estuary
southward through the Channel toward southern France, all actions by German
surface forces were conducted during the night. This required a high degree
of navigational skill because most navigational lights had been shut down. Yet
despite all defensive measures, there were frequent attacks by the British coastal
forces, mostly motor gunboats and motor launches. The British had a fairly good
knowledge of the German routes and used radar to select ambush positions.69
The British coastal forces too had to operate mostly at night, because a great
threat from Luftwaffe aircraft remained.70
During the struggle for Crete in May 1941, Admiral Andrew Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of the Mediterranean Fleet, informed the Admiralty in London that the scale of enemy air attacks prevented his ships from
operating during daylight hours in the Aegean or off the coasts of Crete. Hence,
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he warned, the British navy could no longer guarantee that it could prevent seaborne landings without incurring losses that might lead to sacrificing command
of the eastern Mediterranean.71 During the Yom Kippur / Ramadan War of October 1973 the threat from the air forced the Israeli navy to carry out most of its
missions during the night hours, as naval battles off Latakia on 7/8 October and
Damietta–Baltim on 8/9 October (discussed below) illustrate.
PREREQUISITES
The main prerequisites for success in littoral warfare are suitable and diverse
platforms, weapons, and sensors; robust command organization; close cooperation among friendly forces; air superiority; well developed theory; and sound
doctrine.
The physical environment in the littorals, in typical narrow seas particularly,
requires a naval force differently composed from that employed on the open
ocean. Obviously, large surface combatants, such as aircraft carriers, cruisers, and
SSNs, could if necessary operate in a typical narrow sea in a time of high-intensity
conventional war. However, as noted, their speed and maneuverability would be
drastically reduced. They would be also very vulnerable to ASCMs launched by
aircraft, small surface combatants, SSKs, and coastal batteries, as well as to smallboat swarms and advanced mines. The risks of operating highly capable but also
very expensive platforms outweigh potential benefits. A surface combatant operating in narrow seas should perhaps not exceed 1,200 to 1,500 tons. Common
to all ships optimally designed for operations in the littorals are small size, moderately high speed, shallow draft, high maneuverability, moderate range and endurance, and low signatures (radar, infrared, acoustic, and magnetic). Advanced
SSKs, light frigates (FFLs), multipurpose corvettes, and FACs are much better
suited for combat in littoral waters. Small surface combatants can be employed
effectively in shallow waters where large surface ships cannot operate or where
risks for them are too high. They are generally more suitable for conducting ASW,
defense and protection of friendly shipping, and anti-combat-craft defense. They
are also much less expensive and can be built or acquired in larger numbers. Yet
for all their advantages, small surface combatants also have a number of deficiencies. They have little space, small buoyancy reserve, and inadequate structural
integrity. They are extremely vulnerable to the attacks from the air and by larger
counterparts. In case of a hit by a missile or bomb, a small surface combatant
has little chance to survive. Because of their small size, enclosed-sea theaters are
almost ideal for the employment of land-based attack aircraft, fighters, patrol
aircraft, helicopters, and UAVs. Plainly, strategic mobility plays no role for a small
coastal navy in the littorals. Because of the shorter distances involved, tactical
mobility is almost entirely dependent on the capability to move at maximum
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speed. In general, high speed for a surface combatant incurs much higher
construction costs, greater power requirements, exorbitant fuel consumption,
reduced range and payload, increased maintenance, and lower stealth. But for
small surface combatants, such as multipurpose corvettes and FACs, high speed
is critical not only for mobility but for survivability; they lack staying power and
have to avoid pursuit after launching their missiles or torpedoes. Major surface
combatants, in contrast, would rarely use speeds higher than, say, thirty knots in
a typical narrow sea, because of the shallowness of the water. For them, sustained
transit speed, range, and endurance are far more important, because they often
have to transit long distances before reaching their operating areas.
Hence, the U.S. Navy did not make a good decision in specifying a speed of
more than forty-five knots for its new Littoral Combat Ship (LCS); the result is a
platform optimized neither as a small nor as a large combatant. Reportedly the
LCS can sail about 1,250 nm at its sprint speed.72 However, its range at maximum
speed is likely to be much shorter. At its sustained speed of eighteen knots, the
three-thousand-ton LCS 1 (first of the USS Freedom class) can sail 3,500 nm,
while the 3,100-ton LCS 2 (the Independence class) has a range of about 4,500 nm.
In the operating area, according to some reports, the LCS has to be refueled every
three days.73 Further, it cannot operate at its maximum speed in water less than
twenty feet deep or in traffic or bad weather (sea state 4 and higher).
As on the open ocean, success in littoral warfare requires employment of
diverse combat arms, the deficiencies of each compensated by the strengths of
others. This means that not only the weaker but the stronger side as well should
possess small surface combatants, advanced SSKs, land-based attack aircraft
and helicopters, and UAVs. Yet no single type of surface combatant, however
advanced, is a panacea, nor can it offset the absence of forces optimally suited for
operations in the littorals. In fact, combat elements of other services and branches
—air, army, marines, and special operations forces—should be employed in the
littorals as well.
For successful combat in the littorals, a simple and streamlined littoral
command structure, with the fewest possible intermediate levels, should be
established. For a blue-water navy, like the U.S. Navy, such a command should
be composed of multiservice forces under a joint force commander (JFC) and
directly subordinate to the theater commander. At the tactical level, the optimal
solution is to subordinate directly several joint or combined task forces to the
littoral command. Each of these should be composed of two types of elements,
arbitrarily called a distant cover and support forces and the littoral combat
groups (LCGs). The distant cover and support forces would consist, depending on the mission and the situation, of carrier strike groups, expeditionary
strike groups, surface action groups, SSNs, and marine expeditionary units,
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plus air force attack aircraft and heavy bombers. In some cases, army combat
teams can be part of an LCG as well. An LCG would include surface, subsurface,
and airborne platforms optimally suited for operations in littoral waters, ideally (though the U.S. Navy currently lacks several of these) FFLs, multipurpose
corvettes, FACs, SSKs fitted with AIP, shipborne/land-based multipurpose
helicopters, surface mine-countermeasures ships, unmanned vehicles (UAVs /
unmanned surface vehicles [USVs] / unmanned underwater vehicles [UUVs]),
and special operations force (SOF) teams. Each LCG should be tailored for a
particular mission, such as for obtaining/maintaining sea control, denying sea
control, or attacking the enemy’s or defending friendly shipping. This means that
the composition of LCGs should be tailored depending on the mission and the
situation.
For a small or medium country, all services of the armed forces deployed in
the littorals should be subordinate to a single command commander. Directly
subordinate to such a commander should be several maritime or naval district
commands, each of them consisting of several maritime or naval combat sectors (zones). At the tactical level, forces for littoral combat might consist of a
number of AIP SSKs, multipurpose corvettes, diverse FACs, small amphibious
ships and craft, mine-countermeasures ships and craft, land-based helicopters,
UAVs/UUVs/USVs, coastal missile/gun batteries, special forces teams, and remotely controlled minefields. These forces should be organized in combat groups
depending on a particular mission. They should be supported by land-based
fighter, attack, and reconnaissance aircraft and larger army units. The emphasis
of smaller and medium navies would be primarily on sea denial.
In World War II, the British and the Germans established command organizations for their respective coastal forces struggling for control of the North Sea
and the English Channel. The Royal Navy established main bases for its coastal
forces in East Anglia, at Great Yarmouth, Lowestoft, and Felixstowe. They were
responsible for administration and maintenance of light forces operating from
them. However, operationally these forces were controlled by CINC, the Nore,
at Chatham. In February 1943, an intermediate level of command was created
with the establishment of Coastal Forces (Nore), under a navy captain. The main
responsibility of this new command was to unify training of all coastal forces according to a common doctrine.74
The German organization was in some ways similar to the one established by
the British. After reorganization in February 1941, Commander of Security, West
(Befehlshaber der Sicherung West), with headquarters in Paris, was responsible
for defense of the French Channel and Atlantic coasts. He was directly subordinate to Naval Group Command West (Marinegruppenkommando West) (after
September 1942 also Commanding Admiral, France), in Paris. Commander,
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Naval Group Command West was subordinate not to the CINC of the western
theater but directly to the High Command of the Navy in Berlin. He had under
him three security divisions: the 2nd (responsible for the zone from the Scheldt
estuary to Cherbourg), the 3rd (Cherbourg to Saint-Nazaire), and the 4th (SaintNazaire to the Spanish border). In November 1942, the 6th Security Division was
established and was responsible for defense of southern France’s coast. Each security division consisted of flotillas of picketboats, submarine chasers, minelayers,
and minesweepers. The principal mission of Commander of Security, West was
defense and protection of cargo vessels carrying important raw materials (e.g.,
iron ore from Spain).75
The S-boats, which played a principal role, were subordinate to Naval Group
Command West, but via Commander of Scouting Forces (Befehlshaber der
Aufklaerungsstreitkraefte) and the Leader, Torpedo Boats (Fuehrer der Torpedoboote). This rather rigid command structure soon proved inadequate; in the
spring of 1942, Leader of Torpedo Boats was renamed Leader, S-Boats (Fuehrer
der Schnellboote). This new organization provided more flexibility in command
and control of the S-boats. The Germans established their S-boat bases in Rotterdam, Ostend, Boulogne, and Cherbourg. In addition, the bunkers at Le Havre for
R-boats (Raümboote, minesweepers), were used by S-boats, as were the smaller
ports of Vlissingen (the Netherlands), Saint-Malo (Brittany), and Saint Peter Port
(Guernsey).76
Today, smaller navies operating in the littorals are organized in either naval
districts or naval flotillas. For example, the Iranian naval forces in the Persian
Gulf are subordinate to three naval districts: the 1st Naval District, at Bandar Abbas, for the Strait of Hormuz; the 2nd Naval District, at Bushehr, for the central
Persian Gulf; and the 3rd Naval District, at Mahshahr, for the northern Persian
Gulf. Each naval district includes several naval bases; the independent naval base
at Chabahar is responsible for operations in the Gulf of Oman.77 In contrast, the
Royal Swedish Navy’s seagoing forces are organized into three flotillas: the 1st
Submarine Flotilla, at Karlskrona (submarines, a submarine rescue unit, a marine
transport unit); the 3rd Naval Flotilla, at Karlskrona (33 Mine Clearance Division, 34 Maintenance Division); and the 4th Naval Flotilla, at Berga (41 Corvette
Division, 42 Mine Clearance Division, 43 Maintenance Division, 44 Navy Diver
Division). In addition, there is an amphibious regiment and a naval base, both
at Karlskrona.
Littoral warfare is inherently joint (multiservice) and often combined (multinational). In the modern era, no single combat arm or service can reach its full
potential unless it is employed in combination with other combat arms, branches,
and services. Among other things, shortcomings in the capabilities of one service
can be balanced by the complementary capabilities of others. A JFC has more
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options than a single-service component commander in employing his forces,
because sea, land, air, and special-operations elements offer a wider range of possibilities. At the same time, the enemy is put at a great disadvantage against a multidimensional threat for which he might not have an effective counter. Multiservice forces allow a creative operational commander to combine their diverse but
complementary capabilities in asymmetrical as well as symmetrical ways and generate greater impact than the sum of the individual parts.78 For example, missilearmed surface combatants can attack a variety of targets on the enemy coast,
while land-based aircraft can strike enemy warships and merchant ships at sea
or in their bases and ports. Friendly ground forces can seize enemy naval bases,
ports, and airfields and thereby greatly facilitate the task of obtaining sea control.
Joint employment of two or more services also has some disadvantages. One
is that command organization / C2 is more complex than in the employment of
single-service forces. The different service cultures and doctrines might lead to
misunderstanding and make cooperation difficult. Other potential challenges
include parochialism of services, personal incompatibility (or even animosity)
among high commanders, poor operations security, and insufficient interoperability. Communications arrangements are more cumbersome because of differing systems and procedures used by various services. (This is an especially
difficult problem to resolve in employing multinational forces.) Deployment of
combat forces and logistical support and sustainment also pose much greater
challenges than for single-service forces. Information flow within a multiservice
or multinational force is also generally much slower than in a single-service force.
Perhaps the most critical prerequisite for success in littorals is air superiority over the major part of the theater. The struggle for the control of the air in
the littorals cannot be separated from that in the airspace over adjacent coastal
areas. Because of the short distances, the effectiveness of aircraft against ships
and targets on the coast is much higher in a typical narrow sea than on the open
ocean. Aircraft represent a constant threat to the survivability of all vessels, but
especially to surface ships. The ever-present threat from land-based aircraft can
even preclude the employment of large surface combatants in a narrow sea. Their
survivability and that of merchant vessels while operating within the effective
range of enemy land-based aircraft can be ensured only by reliable and effective
air cover. The effectiveness of land-based aircraft against surface ships was demonstrated for the first time in European waters in World War II. The Luftwaffe
was instrumental for the successful German invasion of Norway in April–June
1940. The Royal Navy’s failure to deny the use of the sea to the Germans in the
first days of the campaign was a result of the intensity and effectiveness of the
Luftwaffe attacks when protection was not provided by Allied fighters based
ashore.79
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The Luftwaffe’s effectiveness in attacking the surface combatants was on full
display during the final phase of the struggle for Crete in late May 1941. The
Royal Navy was extensively committed to evacuating troops to Alexandria,
Egypt. During this effort Allied ships were subjected to massive attacks from the
Luftwaffe’s VIII Air Corps. One effect of these attacks was to force the Allies to
abandon attempts to evacuate troops from Crete’s northern coast.80 Luftwaffe
bombers and dive-bombers sank three Allied cruisers, six destroyers, five motor torpedo boats, and several smaller ships.81 In addition, two battleships, one
aircraft carrier, six cruisers, and seven destroyers were damaged. Some thirty-two
Allied transports, supply ships, and fleet auxiliaries with about 128,500 tons were
sunk or had to be abandoned, and twelve ships with 94,500 tons were lost at sea.82
Admiral Cunningham pointed out that in three days he had lost two cruisers and
four destroyers, as well as a battleship, two more cruisers, and four destroyers severely damaged.83 The struggle for Crete shows that in the modern era sea control
cannot be obtained without the control of the air. The answer to enemy airpower
can only be superior airpower.84
Success in littoral warfare is hardly possible without sound theory. The theory
of littoral warfare should be a separately developed but at the same time an integral part of the theory of naval warfare as a whole. One of the main purposes
of naval theory is to provide a broad and deep framework for understanding the
entire spectrum of warfare at sea. However, a major problem is the lack of a coherent theory of littoral warfare. Classical naval thinkers—notably Rear Admiral
Alfred T. Mahan (1840–1914), Vice Admiral Philip H. Colomb (1831–99), Sir
Julian S. Corbett (1854–1922), Vice Admiral Wolfgang Wegener (1875–1956),
and Vice Admiral Raoul Castex (1878–1968)—generally drew no distinction
between warfare conducted on the open ocean and in the littorals. Yet all of them
discussed from a historical perspective many naval encounters that occurred in
the littorals. Mahan, in his Naval Strategy: Compared and Contrasted with the
Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land (1911), explained in some
detail many aspects of what would be considered today operational-level warfare in the littorals. Colomb, in Naval Warfare: Its Ruling Principles and Practice
Historically Treated (1891), provided numerous historical examples of war in the
littorals in his analysis of what he called “the struggle for the command of the
sea” and “attacks on the territory from the sea.”85 Corbett, in Some Principles of
Maritime Strategy, made many references to the role of naval forces during the
Anglo-Dutch Wars (1652–54, 1665–67, and 1672–74) in the English Channel
and North Sea, the British blockade of the French fleet in Atlantic ports and the
Mediterranean during the Napoleonic Wars, the Royal Navy’s support of the
army of General Arthur Wellesley (later Field Marshal, First Duke of Wellington)
(1769–1852) during the Peninsular War (1808–14), and the naval actions in the
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Yellow Sea during the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905). Wegener’s main focus,
in his Naval Strategy of the World War (1929), was on explaining the Imperial
German Navy’s failure to obtain freedom of action outside the confines of the
North Sea; he explained in some detail the strategic situation in the North Sea
during World War I.86 Castex wrote the five-volume Strategic Theories (1929–35),
where he paid a great deal of attention to historical analysis of warfare in the
littorals. Among other things, Castex analyzed the German operations in the
North Sea and the influence of geography in naval warfare.87 Colonel Charles E.
Callwell of the British Army, though not widely known, was perhaps one of the
first influential proponents of joint warfare in the littorals. In his classic work
Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance he described and analyzed
in great detail naval bases and fortresses and their capture by fleet forces, land
operations against enemy fleets and merchant shipping, and the benefits of having “maritime command” against an enemy stronger on land. He also compared
maritime and land lines of operations. Callwell explored influence of “maritime
command” on military lines of operation in the coastal area. A major part of his
work was focused on amphibious landings and siege of “maritime fortresses.” He
also devoted a long chapter to the influence of inland waters and waterways on
military operations.88
Optimally, foundations of a theory of littoral warfare should be historical experience and the vision of the future war at sea. The latter is based primarily on
the influence of the current and anticipated new technologies on the character of
war at sea. Overemphasis on either historical experiences or technology would
invariably result in an unsound naval theory. It is an especially grave error to
develop naval theory and then doctrine based on exaggerated belief in the value
of new technologies. Also, a naval theory should not be developed on the basis of
fiscal difficulties of the moment or political ideology. In all these cases, the result
will be a naval theory disconnected from the operational realities. Examples of
naval theories that made both kinds of errors are the “Young Schools” of France
(the Jeune École) of the mid-1870s to the early 1900s and of the Soviet Union, in
the late 1920s and mid-1930s.
The French Young School was based almost entirely on an exaggerated view of
the benefits of the new technologies and on mislearned lessons from the AustroItalian War of 1866, reinforced by France’s dismal economic situation in the aftermath of the war with Prussia in 1870–71.89 Its leading proponent, Vice Admiral
Hyacinthe Laurent Théophile Aube (1826–90), contended that command of the
sea, obtained through a naval battle or blockade, had become highly problematic
because of the new technological advances. Aube’s ideas were widely accepted
by young French naval officers, who believed that they had found a new naval
warfare concept for attack on and defense of the coast—a network of “sleeping”
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torpedoes and coastal fortifications, combined with ram ships, floating batteries,
and high-speed, seventy-ton, twenty-knot gunboats, and torpedo boats, as well as
fifty-ton “defensive” boats supported by armored ships.90 These views also found
a receptive audience in Austria-Hungary, for reasons that were political, military,
and fiscal.
The Soviet “Young School,” which emerged in the 1920s (in opposition to an
“Old School” of Mahanian former tsarist officers), was based on the poor state
of the Soviet Union’s economy and fleet, its Marxist-Leninist ideology, and principles of partisan (guerrilla) warfare. Its proponents advocated a navy composed
of light surface combatants, submarines, mines, and land-based naval aircraft;
they also advocated employing submarines jointly with air forces against large
surface ships.91
Despite the shared name, however, the Soviet Young School’s ideas were not
identical to those of the French Young School of the 1880s; arguably the Soviet
strategy was defensive, not offensive, as the French strategy was.92 Both, however,
produced theories potentially applicable to littoral warfare—but only, as it were,
accidentally, on the basis of unrelated and transient national factors, not a true
understanding of naval warfare. Neither school produced forces or concepts
viable for naval operations in the littorals, though both were preeminent for a
number of years in their respective countries (and, for the Jeune École, in AustriaHungary as well). Both were abandoned when national situations changed.93
A sound doctrine, regardless of its scale, should revolve around several
“operating concepts.” An operating concept can be tactical or operational; in a
naval context, a “tactical concept” describes in broad terms the employment of
single-type platforms or groups. An “operational concept” aims at operationallevel objectives through major naval or joint operations. An operational concept
specifically for littoral combat should be based on a proper assessment of the
operating area and a realistic vision of future warfare in it. It should describe in
broad and simple terms how forces should be employed. It should not directly or
implicitly refer to a specific operating area or the potential enemy.
An operational concept should be flexible to allow creative ways to employ
one’s forces in case of sudden changes in the situation. It should ensure speed of
action and surprise. It should pose a threat from multiple physical mediums (sea,
air, and land) and thereby considerably limit the enemy’s options. It should also
provide for operational deception and surprise. It should integrate both offensive
and defensive information operations (IO) capabilities. Finally, an operational
concept should be articulated clearly and succinctly.
In U.S. practice, an operational concept encompasses a number of “functional
concepts” to ensure its effective application in combat. The principal types of
functional concepts are notional force composition, command organization,
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command and control, maneuver, fires, sequencing and synchronization of
combat forces, logistical support and sustainment, and force protection. Each
functional concept in turn comprises a number of “enabling concepts,” describing
tactics and procedures.94
A sound doctrine for littoral warfare should encompass several different operational concepts. For the stronger side the key operational concept should be
sea control, while for the weaker side the focus should be sea denial. However,
prudence also dictates that a stronger side should develop an operational concept
for sea denial as well. Doctrine for littoral warfare at the operational level of war
should include operational concepts for amphibious landings, antiamphibious
defense, attack on enemy trade, and defense and protection of friendly maritime
trade. Littoral warfare doctrine should also include tenets of operational command organization, C2, and leadership; operational decision making and planning; and operational (supporting) functions (intelligence, IO, fires, logistics,
and protection). Doctrine for littoral warfare cannot be written as a stand-alone
document; it should be developed as an integral part of a navy’s doctrine for the
operational level of war. Warfare on the open ocean and warfare in littorals are
inseparable parts of warfare at sea as a whole.
OBJECTIVES
In general, the principal objectives of naval warfare are sea control, sea denial,
choke-point control or denial, basing/deployment-area control (or denial), and
destruction or weakening of the enemy’s military-economic potential at sea, and
preservation of one’s own. Although there are many similarities among the main
methods used on the open ocean and in the littorals for accomplishing these
objectives, there are also considerable differences. Normally, the principal objective of a stronger side at the very beginning of hostilities would be to obtain and
then maintain sea control—the ability to use a given part of the sea or ocean and
associated airspace for military and nonmilitary purposes and deny the same to
the enemy during open hostilities.
Sea control exists in various degrees and states (spatial extents). These variations are the product of a complex interplay among the factors of space, time,
and force. Generally, the degree of sea control depends on the size of the ocean/
sea area; distances to the operating area from one’s basing/deployment area; and
relative numerical/qualitative naval strength (plus in some cases nonnaval forces)
compared with the enemy forces.
Control of the surface is relatively easier to obtain in a narrow sea with a
few or no offshore islands. Narrow seas with large numbers of offshore islands
or archipelagoes pose the greater challenges because of the numerous hiding
places, especially for small surface combatants. The presence of advanced SSKs
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and sophisticated mines would make it extremely difficult to obtain the desired
degree of control of the subsurface in the littorals. Control of the air is perhaps
even more elusive, especially in the littorals, with a multitude of offshore islands
or archipelagoes.
The spatial extent of sea control can be general or local or a combination of
these two. General control means a loose control, mainly sea surface, of a larger
part of a given maritime theater. Local sea control is intended to obtain and
maintain a high degree of control in all physical dimensions but in a smaller part
of the theater where an operational objective is located. It depends on the general
situation in a given maritime theater.95 Sometimes a stronger side possesses a
general control of a maritime theater but local control is in the hands of a weaker
opponent. For example, in the aftermath of the landing at Leyte on 20 October
1944, the Allies controlled Leyte Gulf and the approaches to the Philippine Archipelago generally. However, they did not control the western approaches to Leyte
Island, especially during the night hours and in bad weather. This situation, in
turn, allowed the Japanese to bring in fresh troops and matériel to Leyte from
nearby islands in the Visayas and near Mindanao;96 they used mostly barges but
also transports, submarine chasers, and destroyers, until 9 December. The main
reason for the Allied failure in the western approaches to Leyte was a lack of
ships larger than PT boats but smaller than destroyers and capable of operating
in confined waters, and also of sufficient aircraft fitted with radar for operating
at night.97
Sea control on the open ocean cannot be isolated from control in the littorals.
At the same time, the influence of land is far more pronounced in a typical narrow sea than it is on the open ocean. There is no real sea control unless a stronger
side controls both the sea and adjacent land area.98 In a narrow sea, control of
the high seas does not necessarily mean control of waters within the groups of
islands or archipelagoes. Success in the struggle for sea control requires the closest cooperation among all services.99
On the open ocean, sea control is obtained primarily by destroying or at least
neutralizing a major part of the enemy’s forces at sea or their basing areas. In
contrast, in a typical narrow sea, a side weaker at sea but having stronger ground
forces and air superiority could obtain sea control largely by capturing the sea’s
exit(s), the enemy’s main naval bases and airfields, and key islands. For example,
and despite the inferiority of the Kriegsmarine, the German army, with the support of the Luftwaffe, essentially obtained sea control over the eastern part of the
Baltic and the Gulf of Finland in the initial phase of the invasion of the Soviet
Union on 22 June 1941. Army Group North advanced quickly along the Baltic
coast in the first few weeks and by September 1941 had seized the entire coast
(except the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland), including the large Soviet naval
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bases at Leningrad and Kronshtadt. Hence the Germans and the Finns could
operate in the Bay of Kronshtadt to destroy the remainder of the Soviet Baltic
Fleet.100
In June 1941, the Germans relied on their army’s rapid advance along the coast
of the Black Sea coast to obtain control of that sea. Army Group South advanced
through southern Ukraine to seize the Crimean Peninsula, with its large naval
base at Sevastopol, and other, Ukrainian ports. Despite bitter Soviet resistance,
by October the Germans occupied most of the Crimea, including the Kerch Peninsula. Yet the Sevastopol fortress did not fall into German hands until early July
1942. The German offensive in southern Russia in that summer led to the capture
of almost all the remaining Soviet naval bases and ports in the Black Sea. However, Tuapse, Poti, and other smaller bases along the southern Caucasian coast
of the Black Sea were never captured by the Germans; having failed to eliminate
the Soviet naval forces completely, the Germans never obtained full control of the
Black Sea. Soviet naval forces remained a constant nuisance for German supply
traffic on the Black Sea.101
For the weaker side in the littorals, the principal objective would be to deny
control of the sea to the opponent—that is, frustrate partially or completely the
enemy’s use of the sea for military and commercial purposes. Alternatively, a state
of disputed or contested sea control might exist, in which the opposing sides possess roughly equal strength, there is no significant change in the ratio of forces,
and the initiative does not shift to either side.102 Such a situation is characterized
by an almost continuous struggle for control, which when achieved is usually
maintained for only a short time and then lost and then obtained again. Disputed
sea control is characterized by large losses on both sides.
A stronger side can have a high degree of control on the open ocean but much
less closer to the continental landmass. Complete control of a narrow sea cannot
be obtained as long as the opponent, however weak, exists and is active. For example, during World War I, the British Grand Fleet never had control of the eastern
and southeastern part of the North Sea. Likewise, control of the Adriatic was essentially in the hands of the Austro-Hungarian navy throughout the entire war.103
In the past, weaker navies achieved results by attacking enemy coasts or maritime trade while avoiding fleet-on-fleet encounters. For example, in World War
I, the German navy harassed the British and conducted minor actions to reduce
the British margin of superiority to such an extent that eventually the High Seas
Fleet (Hochseeflotte) took the offensive.104 The Germans also hoped that successful attacks on the Entente’s trade routes might force the British to divert some of
their naval strength and thereby make the Grand Fleet more vulnerable to ambushes by light surface forces. Containment of the High Seas Fleet required the
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presence of British ships that otherwise could have been doing something else.
Also, decisive actions against U-boats, such as laying an effective mine barrier off
the German coast, could not be undertaken during the entire war, because of the
presence of the German battle fleet in the area.105
The struggle for control of straits/narrows or “choke points” is a unique feature of the control of enclosed or semienclosed seas. To control a narrow sea a
blue-water navy must first control the sea’s exits. This could be limited to control
of the airspace above it, but obviously full control of the exit in all three physical dimensions (surface, subsurface, air) is far preferable. For a blue-water navy,
general control of the open ocean is hardly possible without establishing not only
general control of waters adjacent to a narrow sea but also control of its exits/
entrances. Conversely, for a riparian state it is absolutely critical to have free
access to open waters beyond the confines of the narrow sea on which it lies.
Choke-point control, then, is an offensive objective for a stronger side, and denying that control—an easier task —is a defensive objective for the weaker. Not only
naval forces but other services as well would be employed, either way.
A great advantage for a weaker opponent in such a case is that its forces would
operate along multiple and much shorter lines of operation and retreat. The
blue-water opponent can use only a single line of operation and a single line of
retreat. Another advantage of the weaker force is that sometimes it may be able
to seize and maintain sea control of a strait and its approaches with nonnaval
forces alone.
Experience shows that control of a sea’s only exit is usually insufficient to deny
the weaker fleet freedom of action within a given narrow sea; full or partial control of operationally significant positions must be obtained as well. For example,
in World War I, the French fleet blockaded the Strait of Otranto early in the war
but made only occasional forays farther north into the southern Adriatic. This
left the much weaker Austro-Hungarian fleet almost undisputed control of the
Adriatic throughout the war. Had the Entente navies made a strong effort to
destroy the Austro-Hungarian fleet, they could have prevented the German and
Austro-Hungarian U-boats from carrying out their deadly attacks on Entente
shipping in the Mediterranean.106
In another example, during World War II the Allies had strategic control of
the Mediterranean because they controlled the Strait of Gibraltar and the Suez
Canal. (Turkey being formally neutral, neither the Allies nor the Axis controlled
the Turkish Straits.) Within the Mediterranean, the Allies controlled in 1940–43
only a single operationally significant position, the island of Malta; the Bonifacio
Strait, the Strait of Messina, and the Strait of Otranto were in the hands of the
Axis, while control of the Sicilian Narrows was disputed.
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Choke-point control can also cut off an enemy’s links overseas. Conversely,
blocking a choke point from within the enclosed sea to prevent any outside force
from entering is a form of self-blockade, usable only if no further offensive actions are planned.107
Another objective of naval warfare in the littorals is to ensure the security of
basing and deployment areas; otherwise it would be difficult, if not impossible, to
obtain, maintain, or deny sea control. At the beginning of hostilities the stronger
side would try to expand its own basing and deployment areas and prevent the
weaker side from doing the same. Basing/deployment-area control is one of the
primary responsibilities of the operational commander. It is an integral part of
theater-wide or operational protection. Not only naval forces but those of other
services would be employed.
Basing/deployment-area control is an operational objective accomplished by
a series of tactical actions and protection measures conducted during the entire
war at sea. The principal defensive tactical actions include reconnaissance and
surveillance; patrolling of the approaches of one’s naval bases, ports, and selected
parts of the coast; air, antisubmarine, and anti-combat-craft defense; defensive
mining and mine countermeasures; and defense against commando raids and
combat swimmers. Offensive tactical actions include destruction of enemy surface combatants potentially threatening one’s naval bases/ports, attacks on the
enemy’s naval/air bases and ports and installations/facilities on the coast, and laying of mines in the enemy’s coastal waters. Protection of basing and deployment
areas is significantly enhanced by a variety of passive and active measures, such
as the countering of enemy reconnaissance or surveillance, electronic warfare,
and cover and concealment. Additionally, a number of protective measures can
improve the survivability of forces, coastal installations, and facilities. Once obtained, basing/deployment control must be maintained, and everything possible
done to deny the same to the opponent.
“Trade warfare” or “economic warfare”—attack on the enemy’s maritime trade
and defense and protection of friendly shipping—is an integral part of a much
broader task of weakening or destroying the enemy’s military-economic potential and protecting one’s own. In the littorals, the priority is shipping at sea / in
ports, ports, shipyards and ship-repair facilities, installations critical for supply
and sustainment of forces on the land front, the needs of war industry, and the
population.108 This task is much more difficult for a weaker side because of its
inability to ensure an adequate degree of sea control. But it can still protect sea
routes close to its coast and within island chains, if it establishes multilayered
defenses. In general, maritime traffic is much easier to defend if friendly troops
control the coastal area, including naval bases, ports, and airfields.
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METHODS
The principal methods of combat employment of naval forces generally are tactical actions, major naval operations, and maritime campaigns. Naval warfare in
the littorals would be characterized by numerous and diverse tactical actions
fought on the surface, beneath the surface, and in the air. Minor tactical objectives would be primarily accomplished by attacks and strikes, while major tactical
objectives would normally require naval raids, engagements, or battles. Naval
tactical actions are normally an integral part of major naval/joint operations but
they could be, as the example of the Solomons campaign of 1942–44 illustrates,
also conducted independently. Yet they should be invariably part of a given operational framework—that is, contributing directly or indirectly to the accomplishment of a given operational or strategic objective. For example, between 9 August
1942 and 25 November 1943 fifteen major surface actions were fought in the
waters around the islands of Guadalcanal, New Georgia, and Bougainville. All of
them were a part of the struggle for sea control in the Solomons Archipelago and
its approaches. All but three of these actions were fought at night. The Japanese
(who were much better than the Allies in night fighting and the use of gunnery
and torpedoes in combination) won or achieved draws in ten of them. No fewer
than seven naval battles and engagements were fought for Guadalcanal alone.
The Japanese losses (including the fighting off New Guinea and the Bismarck
Archipelago) amounted to two battleships, one small aircraft carrier, three heavy
and three light cruisers, and thirty-six destroyers. In addition, Japanese naval air
strength was so severely depleted that the air wings of fast aircraft carriers could
thereafter no longer be properly manned. An even more serious problem for the
Japanese was that new construction was unable to make up for the losses. No
more battleships or heavy cruisers were built by the Japanese, and only half of the
lost destroyers were ever replaced.109
During the Yom Kippur / Ramadan War of October 1973 the Israelis fought
two naval battles, one each with the Egyptians and the Syrians. In the night of
6/7 October, a force of five Israeli missile boats patrolled off Syria’s coast, some
two hundred miles from their home base. The Israeli boats identified and then
sank with gunfire one Syrian torpedo boat at about 2230. The same force then
swept the Syrian coast off the port of Latakia and sank one Syrian minesweeper
with gunfire, before detecting three Syrian missile boats and one minesweeper
at about 2335. In the subsequent missile exchange, all three Syrian missile boats
were sunk within twenty-five minutes.110 In the night of 8/9 October, six Israeli
missile boats approached the Egyptian coast to shell the military installations and
coastal defenses in the area of Damietta. Around midnight, four Egyptian missile
boats engaged them. Three of the Israeli missile boats launched their missiles,
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and within forty minutes three Egyptian boats were sunk; the fourth was out of
range and escaped to safety.111
The principal method of combat employment to accomplish a single operational objective in littorals is a major naval operation—a series of major and
minor naval tactical actions fought on the surface, under the surface, and in the
air. A major naval operation in the littoral should be planned and conducted by a
single commander and in accordance with a common operational idea (scheme).
Many major naval operations were conducted during World War II in the littorals. The best-known examples are the battle of Matapan on 27–29 March 1941;
escape of the German battle cruisers from Brest through the English Channel,
11–13 February 1942 (Operation CERBERUS); convoys to Malta on 12–15 June
1942 (Operation HARPOON/VIGOROUS) and on 10–15 August 1942 (PEDESTAL);
and amphibious landings on Sicily on 10 July 1943 (HUSKY), and at Salerno on 9
September 1943 (AVALANCHE). The most recent example of a major naval/joint
operation in the littorals was the British recapture of the Falklands/Malvinas on
2 April–14 June 1982 (Operation CORPORATE).
Because of the overlap of the physical mediums in which services operate,
major operations in the littorals conducted predominantly by a single service
would be very rare. All major amphibious landing operations are inherently
joint/combined (multinational), regardless of the physical environment; also,
attacks on major naval bases and ports, support of the coastal flank of friendly
troops, and attacks on and defense of maritime trade in narrow seas require the
closest cooperation among the services. Naval forces will have the principal roles,
nevertheless, in major operations designed to destroy or neutralize enemy fleets
at sea or their bases. The weaker side will have few if any opportunities to plan
and execute major naval/joint operations to deny sea control, but it would often
conduct major operations in antiamphibious defense and the defense of major
naval bases and ports. It might also plan major operations in defense of shipping.
Major naval/joint operations should be planned, prepared, and conducted
by a naval/maritime component commander. In U.S. terms, joint/combined
maritime force component commanders designated at theater-level commands
have sufficient forces for obtaining and maintaining sea control in the littorals.
That responsibility should not be shared by the air component commander; sea
control means control of not only the surface and subsurface but the air as well.
Divided command not only would invariably complicate the accomplishment of
objectives in major naval/joint operations but also might prove quite detrimental.
The planning, preparation, and execution of naval/joint operations in the littorals are highly dependent on uninterrupted, fast, and secure communications to
participating forces. Speed of communications is perhaps one of the most critical
factors for success in combat in the littorals.
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A weaker side at sea can use unconventional and asymmetric tactical methods
to inflict losses on its stronger opponent. One relatively new method involves
so-called swarming attacks, in which a large number of small, fast boats, hidden
in coves on the coast or among islands, would launch massive missile strikes
against large surface combatants or commercial vessels. Success would primarily depend on synchronization of the delivery of almost simultaneous attacks by
many small boats from different directions, to overwhelm missile defenses. For
example, the Iranians reportedly intend to use swarming attacks against the U.S./
coalition naval forces operating in the Persian (Arabian) Gulf, and especially
when transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Swarming attacks would be conducted at
short ranges, perhaps not greater than 6,500 feet.112 Another swarming tactic that
could possibly be effective against large surface combatants would use UAVs, either independently or in combination with massive attacks by small, fast, missilearmed craft. The danger that swarming attacks might pose to major surface
combatants, especially in confined waters like the Strait of Hormuz, should not
be underestimated by a blue-water navy, including the U.S. Navy.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
C2 of naval forces operating in the littoral waters is generally more challenging
than in warfare on the open ocean. Because the small size of the operating area
and high intensity of combat would cause sudden and often drastic changes in the
situation, the main prerequisites for success would be the largest possible degree
of local initiative. This means that true German-style “mission command” should
be applied. The commander’s intent should afford sufficient freedom of action by
subordinates at all levels of command. Unnecessary interference with the responsibilities of subordinate commanders cannot but negatively affect the morale and
combat motivation, resulting in passivity and unwillingness to take the initiative.
Short warning and reaction times and rapid changes in the situation require full
exercise of the initiative at all levels and high tactical skill.113 However, mission
command is not absolute—the higher commander is duty bound to intervene,
either reversing decisions or replacing subordinate commanders, when subordinates’ actions endanger the success of the mission or jeopardize the missions of
neighboring commanders.
Mission command requires highly educated and well trained subordinates;
otherwise directive orders must be used. The higher commanders and their subordinates must share in mission accomplishment. This implies complete trust
in each other’s professional and personal qualities. In littoral warfare, personal
relationships between commanders and their subordinates are especially critical,
given the small crews involved and immediate personal danger. Hence, great
attention must be given to unit cohesion on board individual ships and forces.
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Networking of surface ships, aircraft, and submarines is potentially beneficial
in the open waters off a continental landmass, such as off the coast of Africa or
in the Indian Ocean. Yet the weaker side at sea could obtain even greater benefits
by knitting together its seagoing and shore-based forces and thereby obtaining
a real- or near-real-time picture of the situation in the initial phases. It can also
effectively integrate employment of all naval and other forces in denying access
to its littorals.
In a war between two strong opponents, tactical commanders would have
much less time than in open waters to estimate situations and make sound decisions. Advanced information technologies allow commanders to share information obtained from the common operational picture (COP) and cooperative
engagement capability (CEC). A COP provides to all commanders an integrated,
graphical depiction of the battle space based on a single, shareable set of data. It
presents the current locations, statuses, and often planned movements of friendly, neutral, and enemy ground, maritime, and air forces. It can also display other
information, such as the weather and battle-damage assessments.114 Depending
on the level of command, it is possible to choose what information to display. A
potential problem is that commanders looking at the same data might interpret
them differently and therefore form different pictures of the situation.115
A COP is developed by correlating and fusing data from multiple, dissimilar
data sources, such as tactical data links, reconnaissance/surveillance, and sensor
networks. Currently, tactical data links provide the bulk of the data that constitute
the COP. These data inputs are often huge, originating from overlapping sensor
systems and passing through links that are unable to segregate redundant and
erroneous data before they are all fused into a COP.116 To eliminate false and
redundant data across subnetworks and prevent them from entering the COP
requires extensive cross-checking and filtering. This would require effort and
time that might not be available when operating in the littorals.117
At the tactical level, a common tactical picture (CTP) is created. Various CTPs
are correlated and fused to create a new database that is then used to build the
COP. However, data used to build a COP or CTP mean little without a context
—that is, personal understanding of how data were developed and what their
sources were. Not all available data are allowed onto the CTP, and not all data
from various CTPs are allowed into the COP.118
One of the potentially greatest problems here for littoral combat is that operational commanders might interfere in the responsibilities of tactical commanders. It is a dangerous illusion to believe that a COP provides sufficient fidelity to
allow operational commanders to make tactical decisions. They and their staffs
are too far away to understand the situation better than the tactical commander
on the scene of action. Moreover, even if operational commanders had precise
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information, they would not know the context in which information had been
collected and processed. Hence, operational commanders inserting themselves
into a situation would find themselves reacting to events instead of exercising
proper control.119
CEC fuses high-quality tracking data from participating sensors and distributes the result to all other participants in a filtered and combined state using
algorithms to create a single, common, air-defense tactical display.120 The advent
of CEC resulted in great improvement in the accuracy of air-contact tracking,
continuity of tracks, and identification consistency.121 CEC provides a superior
air picture, based on all sensor data available, that allows considerably earlier
detection and more consistent tracking of air contacts than previously possible.
CEC was designed especially against the air threat in littoral waters.122 It extracts
data from sensors aboard surface ships and aircraft in a group and displays firecontrol-quality data in a matter of microseconds to all so that they can engage
incoming targets at maximum intercept ranges.123 Cues based on composite
tracks allow downrange ships to detect targets earlier and maintain track longer.
They also allow the maximum battle space in which to engage theater ballistic
missiles.124
Yet the networking of platforms, weapons, and sensors has a number of technical and human limitations that could adversely affect commanders and staffs
in high-intensity combat in the littorals. All too often, collecting information
becomes an end in itself. Too much information might be collected by higher
headquarters, producing backlogs that cannot be processed or transmitted in a
timely fashion to subordinate tactical commanders. At the tactical level, veritable
floods of information overload users and may desensitize them.125 The most
extensively networked sensors, decision makers, and shooters can only see what
an individual sensor can see. A limitation is the ever-growing communications
bandwidth required to transmit the increased amount of data to decision makers and shooters as sensors are added to the network.126 Another issue is that
different decision makers at different levels may need to see different amounts
and types of information. For example, air, ground, and naval component commanders would require different tactical pictures. This last is perhaps the single
biggest flaw in today’s network-centric environment today, and it is especially
critical for littoral warfare.
A GROWING THREAT
Warfare in the littorals, particularly in narrow seas, differs in important respects
from the war on the open ocean. No maritime theater is more directly affected by
the geomorphologic, hydrographic, and oceanographic features of the environment than a narrow sea. Generally, the small size of the theater, short distances,
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the presence of a large number of islands, proximity of a landmass, the shallowness of water, and great variability and unpredictability of oceanographic
conditions considerably affect the employment of surface ships, submarines, and
aircraft. Although all littorals represent challenges in the employment of naval
forces and aircraft, the most complex and unpredictable environment is that of
the typical narrow sea.
Sea-denial capabilities of the weaker side in the littorals have been significantly increased over the past several decades. A blue-water navy, such as the
U.S. Navy, underestimates or, worse, dismisses the growing threat to large surface
combatants in the littorals, within global choke points, and in their approaches
only at its peril. These threats are bound to increase in scope, range, diversity, and
lethality in the years to come.
Among the principal prerequisites for the successful conduct of war in the
littorals, perhaps the most critical is a force optimally designed for operations
in confined and shallow waters. However, no single-type force, no matter how
capable, can ensure success in the littorals. Forces for littoral combat should be
organized differently from those for war on the ocean; specialized littoral assets should not be considered either as replacements for blue-water forces or
as expendable. The lack of adequate capabilities for littoral warfare could cost
a blue-water navy, such as the U.S. Navy, dearly in the case of a high-intensity
conventional war. So might lack of a sound theory of littoral warfare, operational
concepts, and doctrine; these require much effort and time and cannot be developed in a hurry after hostilities start. Key among the doctrinal tenets for littoral
warfare is that command and control should be centralized at the operational
level. However, the operational commander should apply the true spirit of the
German-style mission command. Subordinate tactical commanders must be
given sufficient freedom to act; they in turn must be ready to take high but prudent risks in executing their assigned missions.
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